- Bliv medlem
-
Log ind
Du er ikke logget ind
Log ind Opret dig - Kurv
Du er ikke logget ind
Beskrivelse
THIS CASEBOOK contains a selection of U. S. Court of Appeals decisions that analyze and discuss issues surrounding hostile work environment claims. Volume 1 of the casebook covers the District of Columbia Circuit and the First through the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
* * *
A hostile environment that violates Title VII "exists when the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment." Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 277 (4th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Thus, to state a hostile work environment claim, [the plaintiff] must allege that: (1) he "experienced unwelcome harassment"; (2) the harassment was based on his race or protected activity; (3) "the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive atmosphere"; and (4) "there is some basis for imposing liability on the employer." Bass, 324 F.3d at 765. Regarding the third element, "[w]hether the environment is objectively hostile or abusive is judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position." Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 277 (internal quotation marks omitted). "That determination is made by looking at all the circumstances, which may include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). "[R]ude treatment," "callous behavior," or "routine difference of opinion and personality conflict," without more, will not suffice. E.E.O.C. v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 521 F.3d 306, 315-316 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Holloway v. Maryland, 32 F. 4th 293 (4th Cir. 2022)
