Hearts and Minds

At the core of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine is the concept of "hearts and minds." Although the concept has significantly deviated from its historical grounding and has become a nebulous concept that is frequently maligned, misunderstood, and misapplied; nonetheless, its original principles remain the cornerstone in current counterinsurgency campaigns. This book examined two historical and two contemporary case studies: The British-Malya in Malaya (1950 to 1960), the British-Omani experience in Dhofar (1970 to 1975), and the current US military experiences in support of the Philippine military, and the US-led International Security Assistance Force ( ISAF) in Afghanistan. The Malayan Emergency gave birth to the term hearts and minds in counterinsurgency application. However, it is vehemently argued that the British administration's highly coercive methods can be categorized hearts and minds. Conversely in Oman, the British were equally victorious in prosecuting the Dhofar Rebellion with very minimal coercive methods. Its success is credited to the small SAS footprint, working with indigenous forces, and legitimizing the host nation government. It is fascinating to note that the current hearts and minds methodology applied by US SOF in the southern Philippines parallels those of Dhofar. On the other hand, the US-led ISAF in Afghanistan continues to struggle in gaining the population's support and missing its mark. The four case studies portray that the hearts and minds has evolved from previously coercion-heavy methods to the current modernization and legitimacy approach based on Western concepts.