Executive Compensation in Imperfect Financial Markets

The recent financial crisis and associated real estate bubble demonstrated the damage that can be caused by imperfect financial market pricing. On the basis of these imperfections, strong financial returns earned by financial institutions in the run-up to 2008 were, in fact, illusory.

Executive Compensation in Imperfect Financial Markets explores the relationship between bank lending, real estate markets and stock market prices. Offering a heterodox view of financial market pricing and its relationship with executive pay, this book offers a competing interpretation of the recent crisis, which emphasizes the role of bank leverage and investor expectations in generating instability - particularly through the interaction of financial institutions with the real estate market. In the process, it reveals that equity-based compensation incentivized increased bank leverage, which was a cardinal cause of the crisis.

This timely book will be an essential read for all legal scholars and policy analysts operating in the field of banking and finance, as well as all those seeking a more rounded understanding of the financial crisis.

Contents:

1. Introduction

2. An Analysis of the Role of Executive Compensation

3. Theories of Securities Market Operation: Principles and Flaws

4. Minsky and the Financial Instability Hypothesis: Implications for Market Efficiency

5. The Global Financial Crisis and the Complex Relationship between Asset Prices, Leverage, and Financial Instability

6. Post-Crisis Reform to Executive Compensation at Financial Institutions

7. Reconstituting Executive Compensation at Financial Institutions: Proposals for Reform

8. Conclusions

Index